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In the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah 
METALS MANUFACTURING 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
BANK OF COMMERCE, a Utah 
Corporation, 
Defendant and Respondent, 
Case No. 
' 10116 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
The defendant and respondent resp·ectfully petitions 
the Court for rehearing upon the following grounds and 
for the following reasons: 
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The Court erred in that it confused the question of 
the application of the private contracts statute with a ques-
tion of the contractual rights of the parties involved under 
a lease agreement. In so doing, it failed to apply control-
ling decisions set down by the Utah Supreme Court for 
determining whether the railings were annexed to the land 
in such a way as to come within the private contracts 
statute. 
POINT II 
The Court's opinion is based upon facts which are 
not contained in the record of the Trial Court and which, 
in fact, are contrary to the facts contained in such record. 
POINT III 
The Court, in its decision, erred in that contrary to 
controlling Utah law, it construed the facts in this case 
in a light favorable to those who the statute is in-
tended to protect rather than in a light most favorable 
to the defendant who had prevailed below. 
POINT IV 
The Court, in its decision, erred in that it failed to 
apply controlling statutes and principles of law which are 
inconsistent with a broad application of the statute in 
questton. 
WHEREFORE, the petitioner prays that the judg-
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mcnt and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargu-
ment be permitted of the entire case. 
A brief in support of this petition is filed herewith. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This brief is submitted to the Supreme Court in sup-
port of a Petition for Rehearing upon the decision of this 
Court filed October 23, 1964, reversing a judgment of the 
third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County holding 
that certain aluminum railings were not in the nature of 
an improvement to a structure on land and were, there-
fore, personal property not subject to the Utah Private 
Contracts statute, Section 14-2-1 and 14-2-2 of the Utah 
Code Annotated. This rehearing is urged upon the Court 
because of the far reaching effect of the unprecedented 
and unjust legal theory announced in the Court's decision. 
Because of the Court's erronious assumption that the 
facts of this case are undisputed, the facts, as established 
by the record in the Trial Court, are set forth below. 
In the spring of 1963, respondent leased a bank build-
ing in Magna, Utah, for the purpose of conducting a com-
mercial banking business. Under the terms of the lease, 
the building was to be remodeled by the lessor to meet 
certain requirements of the lessee. The lease anticipated 
that all furnishings contained in the bank building would 
be furnished by the lessee. Prior to opening its banking 
business, respondent contracted with Arnold Drews of 
Modern Ornamental Iron Works for certain aluminum 
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railings and gates. Drews submitted a bid for this work 
of $1,457.10 which was accepted by respondent (Dep. 
p. 7). Drews r~quested an advance payment on the rail-
ings representing that a lower price could be obtained if he 
had the cash to pay for the materials at the time they were 
ordered. Respondent, through its agent, C. I. Canfield, 
advanced $1,200 upon the representation of Drews that 
the materiaJs were to be furnished by a Los Angeles Com-
pany (Dep. p. 4). Drews, without responde,t's knowl-
edge or consent (Dep. p. 4) contracted with the appellant 
for the construction of these railings and agreed to pay 
appellant $1,748.00 for the railings. He represented to 
the appellant that the railings were constructed for the 
Idaho State Bank. Drews picked up the railings from ap-
pellant and installed them in respondent's bank. Re-
spondent then paid him for the .railings. Drews failed to 
pay appellant for the railings and some two months later, 
when appellant discovered that the railings were, in fact, 
in respondent's bank, it made demand on respondent for 
payment. Since respondent had already made payment 
for the railings, it refused to pay the second time, where-
upon appellant commenced action, under the Utah Pri-
vate Contracts Act, Section 14-2-2 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, to recover the reasonable value of its materials. 
Respondent defended this action before the Trial Court 
sitting without a jury, and after having considered the 
evidence presented by both sides, the Trial Court found 
that respondent had no intent to permanently affix the 
railings to the realty and therefore under Utah law the 
railings were personal property and not subject to the 
Utah Private Contracts Act. 
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POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN THAT IT CONFUSED 
THE QUESTION OF THE APPLICATION OF THE 
PRIVATE CONTRACTS STATUTE WITH A QUES-
TION OF THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHTS O·F THE 
PARTIES INVOLVED UNDER A LEASE AGREE-
MENT. IN DOING SO IT FAILED TO APPLY CON-
TROLLING DECISIONS SET DOWN BY THE UTAH 
SUPREME COURT FOR DETERMINING WHETH-
ER THE RAILINGS IN QUESTIO·N WERE AN-
NEXED TO THE LAND IN SUCH A WAY AS TO 
COME WITHIN THE PRIVATE CONTRACTS STA-
TUTE. 
The question of the rights of third parties under the 
lease was not before the Supreme Court in this case since 
it was not considered by the Trial Court nor was it in any 
way raised by the pleadings. This case does not turn on 
the subjective intent of the parties to the lease agree-
ment. The Supreme Court seems to have the mistaken 
impression that respondent in relying for relief on its 
contractual rights under the lease agreement. This is not 
the case. The respondent relies on objective evidence as 
to whether the property in question was real property 
subject to the Private Contracts Act or personal property 
not subject to the Act. This evidence was presented to 
the Trial Court and in respondents' brief on appeal so as 
to meet the test set forth by the Utah Court in the case 
of King Bros., Inc., v. Utah Dry Kiln Company 13 U 2d 
339, 342, 374 p 2d 154 (1962). 
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The question that is before the Supreme Court in this 
case is application of the private contracts statute to items 
of property about which there is some uncertainty as to 
whether they are real property or personal property. In 
such cases, the Utah Supreme Court has held that uin 
order to qualify under the Private Contracts Statute, it 
is necessary that there be an annexation to the land, or to 
some permanent structure upon it, so that the materials 
in question can properly be regarded as having become a 
part of the realty, or a fixture appurtenant to it, and 
this must have been done with an intention of making it 
a permanent part thereof." King Bros., Inc., supra. 
The test of intention is further explained by the case 
cited by the Supreme Court as authority for the rule in 
the King case supra. That test is set forth as follows: 
uThe intent is not to be gathered from testi-
mony of the actual state of the mind of the party 
making the annexation ~· :z. :z. but is to be inferred, 
when not determined by an express agreement, 
from the nature of the article affixed, the relation 
and situation to the freehold of the party making 
the annexation, the manner of the annexation, and 
the purpose for which it is made." Westinghouse 
Electric SupplJI Company, v. Hawthorn, 150 P. 2d 
55' 57 ( 1944) . 
The Trial Court carefully applied these rules to the 
evidence submitted in the present case and determined as 
a matter of fact that respondent had no intention to per-
manently affix the railings in question to the building. 
Having reached this factual conclusion, the lower court 
applied the rule of the Kin.g case supra to hold that the 
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Private Contracts statute has no application to the present 
case. The Supreme Court by overturning that decision 
has placed itself in the position of the trier of fact. In 
acting as the trier of fact, it has overlooked the rule previ-
ously set down by it in the King Bros. case supra. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S OPINION IS BASED UPON 
FACTS WHICH ARE NO·T CONTAINED IN THE 
RECORD OF THE TRIAL COURT AND WHICH, 
IN FACT, ARE CONTRARY TO THE FACTS CON-
TAINED IN SUCH RECORD. 
1. In paragraph three of its opinion, the Court states 
that the respondent bank u ••• contracted with one Drews 
to obtain and place on the premises certain aluminurr. 
railings and gates, according to specifications demanded 
by the bank. With the bank's knowledge Drews obtained 
the railings and gates from plaintiff ... " [emphasis sup-
plied]. 
The record contains no support for the Court's fac-
tual finding that the respondent had knowledge that the 
railings and gates were purchased from the plaintiff. The 
record (Dep. p. 4) contains the following: 
MR. CANFIELD: u ••• he told me at the time 
he didn't have sufficient aluminum on hand to 
complete the job and would have to order it out 
of Los Angeles. 
ul asked him how long it would take and he 
informed me two or three days. 
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ushortly after that, he called at the bank and 
said that the aluminum railing was coming in ... 
and he didn't have quite enough money to pay for 
them but he could get a discount by paying for 
them at the time and asked me if I would advance 
him a little money to help pick up the costs on this 
material and if I would do so he would decrease 
his bid by 10 percent." 
and in another place, contains the following (Dep. p. 6) : 
uMR. CANFIELD: u ... He asked me if we 
did buy the fixtures from Drews. I told him yes. 
uHe said, have you paid for them? 
uHe said, we made these. 
ul said, I have no knowledge of it." 
The record of the Trial Court clearly shows that 
respondent bank had no knowledge of the source from 
which Drews obtained the railings except the representa-
tion of Drews that they came from Los Angeles. 
2. Respondents presented substantial evidence to the 
Trial Court to support a factual conclusion that the re-
spondents did not install the railings in question with an 
intention of making them a permanent part of the realty. 
In its statement of the pertinent facts of this case, the 
Supreme Court makes no mention of the facts and cir-
cumstances presented by respondents to the Trial Court 
to show the lack of any intention to permanently annex 
the railings to the real estate. If the facts of this case were 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
undisputed as the Supreme Court concludes there would 
be no question as to what the intention of the respondent 
was. Respondent contends that it had no intention of 
making the r(l.ilings in question a permanent part of the 
realty. It supports this fact by evidence as to the nature 
of the railings which shows that they were designed to be 
and were in fact easily portable (Defendants Exhibit D-5, 
Testimony of Respondents' Vice President, Rec. 11, 12, 
1 3, 14) that they were constructed and attached in such 
a way that they could be moved from place to place or 
moved entirely (Rec. 9). These plans for the use of the 
railings were communicated to the lessor of respondents' 
building and among respondents' officers (Rec. 17, 18, 
19, Dep. p. 10, lines 8-10) with regard to the design of 
the railings, Mr. C. R. Canfield, Vice President of re-
spondent, stated at pages 12, 13, 16 and 17 of the record. 
uQ. well, just the general theory of the plan 
that was used for the bank. Was there any one 
central idea that prevailed in planning the bank? 
uA. Well, he set up· the plan of the bank, the 
inside of the bank, so that it can be adjusted and 
moved as situations require it in our operation. 
uQ. Thank you. At the time you planned 
the bank building, did you contemplate the possi-
bility that you might have to move to a different 
building? 
u.A. Well, we discussed it; there is always 
that possibility. · 
u.Q. And if you did move to another build-
ing did you contemplate the necessity of moving 
the interior facilities of the bank? 
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uA. He set it up so that all of the equipment 
we have got belongs to the company, so that we can 
move it if we want to." 
Evidence that respondents were lessees supports a fac-
tual conclusion that they had no intention to permanently 
affix the railings to the realty and thereby enrich the 
freehold. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Hawthorn 
Supra. 
Testimony of a witness engaged in the production of 
such railings indicates that they were frequently moved 
from place to place by banking institutions and are treated 
much the same as furniture (R. 31, line 1-7, 16-24). The 
lease was introduced in the Trial Court not to show that 
appellant "\\ras legally bound by its provisions but rather as 
evidence of the intent of the party annexing the property 
not to permanently annex the property to the realty. 
Respondents intention not to permanently annex the 
railings is shown by evidence that the railings were de-
signed so as to be removable without material injury to the 
premises and that a supply of matching rubber tile was 
maintained by respondent to cover the screwholes in the 
floor in the event the railings were removed, ( Rec. 19, 
line 2 3-3 0 ; 2 0 line 1-6) . Evidence as to the purpose for 
which the annexation was made further supports a factual 
conclusion of lack of intent to permanently affix to the 
realty. The record contains evidence that the railings are 
used to direct traffic in the bank and to decorate the bank's 
interior-all of such evidence supports the factual con-
clusion reached by the Trial Court. 
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The Supreme Court, in its opinion has failed to even 
mention any of this evidence and has concluded that the 
facts arc undisputed, yet in the recent case of King Bros., 
Inc., supra, the court, considering the application of the 
exact same statute that is involved in this case, stated: 
uOrdinarily there is not much difficulty in 
telling when materials become a part of the realty, 
but in the fringe areas where uncertainties exist, 
their status frequently depends on the particular 
circumstances. The facts must be ascertained so 
that under the guidance of applicable principles of 
law the correct determination can be made." 
It would seem that the principal fact in this case, 
namely, what the intention of the annexing party was, is 
very much in dispute. In determining the outcome of this 
dispute, the Trial Court reached the factual conclusion 
that no intent to permanently affix existed. 
POINT III 
THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ERRED IN 
THAT CONTRARY TO CONTROLLING UTAH 
LA\\r IT CONSTRUED THE FACTS IN THIS CASE 
IN A LIGHT FAVORABLE TO THOSE TO WHOM 
THE STATUTE IS INTENDED TO PROTECT 
RATHER THAN IN A LIGHT MOST FA VO·RABLE 
TO THE DEFENDANT WHO HAD PREY AILED BE-
LOW. 
According to its opinion, the Court has construed 
the facts in this case uwith an eye focused on the word-
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ing purpose and intent of the statute involved, and in a 
light favorable to those to whom it intends to protect." 
To put itself in a position to apply this rule, the Court con-
cluded that the facts of the case were not in dispute. In 
light of the quotations and references set forth in II 
above, which show that there is substantial dispute in the 
factual question of intent and on the question of the re-
spondents knowledge of Drews' purchase of the railings 
from appellant, it is clear that this rule would not apply. 
In cases where the lower court has made a factual deter-
mination, the Utah law is as follows: 
uThe question ... being generally one of fact 
as to what was the intention of the parties, is to 
be determined from all attendant circumstances 
... the Defendant having prevailed, is entitled to 
have the Supreme Court view the evidence and 
every fair inference and intendment arising there-
from in the light most favorable to it, and if when 
so regarded, there is any substantial evidence, or, 
as sometimes stated, any reasonable basis in the evi-
dence, to support the finding made by the Trial 
Court, it will not be disturbed." John C. Cutler 
Assn, v. D. Jay Stores, 3 U 2d 107, 279 P 2d 700 
(1955). 
If this rule is applied, the Supreme Court would be 
required to uphold the lower court's conclusion that re-
spondents had no intent to permanently affix the railings 
to the realty, therefore, the railings involved were per-
sonal property not subject to the Utah Private Contracts 
Act. 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT IN ITS DECISION ERRED IN 
THAT IT FAILED TO APPLY CONTROLLING ST A-
TUTES AND PRINCIPLES OF LAW WHICH ARE 
INCONSISTENT WITH A BROAD APPLICATION 
OF THE STATUTE IN QUESTION. 
The first full paragraph on page 2 of the court's 
opinion implies that Section 14-2-1 of the Utah Code 
would apply even though there was no annexation of the 
railings in question to the land or structures upon it so 
as to make the railings a part of the realty. The Court 
apparently held that any person who has furnished ma-
terial or performed labor for or upon any such building, 
structure or improvement, payment for which has not 
been made, shall have a direct right of action against the 
surities upon such bond for the value of the materials or 
labor. 
Such a ruling seems clearly contrary to the statute 
which provides for application only to contracts ccfor 
the construction, addition to, or alteration or repair of, 
any building, structure or improvement upon land .... " 
It also is contrary to the rule in the King Bros. case, supra 
and entirely inconsistent with the rule in Backus v. Hooten 
4 U 2d 364, 294 P 2d 703 (1956) favoring strict con-
struction of a statute imposing double liability. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is submitted that the Supreme Court 
should reconsider this case in light of the cases and facts 
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referred to herein in order to avoid an unjust or unneces-
sary broadening of this statute that would be contrary to 
the intention of the legislature and inconsistent with estab-
lished legal precedents in the State of Utah. A recon-
sideration would also give the Court an opportunity to 
avoid the unjust result reached here on the basis of facts 
not contained in the record of the Trial Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
John A. Dahlstrom and 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Respondent 
3 00 Deseret Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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